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Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc 





The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
recently granted en banc review in Lighting Ballast Control LLC 
v Philips Electronics North America Corp1 to decide whether to 
afford deference to a district court’s interpretation of patent 
claims,2 a step that has been heralded as potentially “lead[ing] 
to fundamental, far-reaching changes in patent law and patent 
litigation strategies.”3 Over the next few months, the parties, 
scores of amici, and commentators will spend reams of paper 
and untold amounts of money arguing whether claim construc-
tion—interpreting the short, numbered paragraphs at the end of 
the patent that define the patentee’s legal rights—should con-
tinue to be reviewed de novo or should be reviewed more defer-
entially. These efforts will be futile. 
The Federal Circuit should be commended for addressing 
claim construction en banc for a fourth time in twenty years.4 
Claim construction is the single most important event in any pa-
tent case. It is a threshold question for virtually every other issue 
 † Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law 
School. Thanks to Jonathan Masur, Jonas Anderson, and Erin Reilly for helpful com-
ments and discussions. 
 1 No 2012-1014, slip op (Fed Cir Mar 15, 2013). 
 2 Id at 2. 
 3 Ropes & Gray LLP, Federal Circuit Orders En Banc Review of Cybor and Stand-
ard of Review for Claim Construction, Ropes & Gray Alert: Intellectual Property Litiga-
tion (Mar 18, 2003), online at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/ 
ce164b07-8e54-4463-9003-3f39f48248f8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/abf58013-
5855-40c3-bc38-4634ce73acfa/20130318_IP_Alert.pdf (visited Apr 30, 2013).  
 4 See Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc); Cybor Corp v 
FAS Technologies, Inc, 138 F3d 1448 (Fed Cir 1998) (en banc); Markman v Westview In-
struments, Inc, 52 F3d 967 (Fed Cir 1995) (en banc).  
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and is often case dispositive or, at least, case determinative.5 
Scholars, judges, and practitioners criticize the Federal Circuit’s 
claim construction doctrine for creating unpredictability and un-
certainty, high reversal rates, panel dependence, disincentives 
to settle, and increased litigation costs.6 These problems normal-
ly are ascribed to one or both of two causes: (1) institutional de-
sign, and primarily the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of claim 
construction; and (2) a deep and persistent methodological split 
over the relative effect on claim interpretation of the description 
of the invention in the patent specification and the “ordinary” 
meaning of claim language as derived from dictionaries, expert 
testimony, and other extrinsic sources. 
It is not surprising that the Federal Circuit chose the first 
issue to review en banc. The standard of review for claim con-
struction has been the more popular target for scholars and 
judges, with deferential review seen as a panacea that will cure 
all that ails the claim construction precedent. Yet, it was the 
wrong choice. Increased deference to district court claim con-
structions will do little or nothing to improve claim construction 
as long as the methodological split remains. And because the 
proper standard of review depends on the nature of the claim 
construction inquiry, the Federal Circuit cannot even effectively 
resolve this issue without first resolving the methodological 
schism. 
The best path forward for the Federal Circuit is to dismiss 
the grant of en banc review in Lighting Ballast as improvidently 
granted and wait for an en banc petition that presents the 
methodological split. This will not happen. Instead, the Federal 
Circuit likely will adopt a more deferential standard of review, 
and practitioners and scholars will herald a new day of certainty 
and predictability in claim construction, only to find a few years 
from now that claim construction is just as unpredictable and 
uncertain, panel dependent, and prone to reversal as ever. 
 5 See R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Em-
pirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in S. Bal-
ganesh, ed, Intellectual Property and the Common Law *4 (forthcoming 2013), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909028 (visited Apr 30, 2013). 
 6 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 Harv J L & Tech 1, 27–28 (2001); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent 
Claim Construction, 38 Rutgers L J 61, 64 (2006); R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, 
Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 
152 U Pa L Rev 1105, 1169–70 (2004). 
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I.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROBLEM 
Before the mid-1990s, the legal doctrine of patent claim con-
struction was underdeveloped, as claim construction was left to 
juries or resolved by judges on the fly during bench trials. Once 
the Supreme Court assigned claim construction to trial judges in 
Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc,7 claim construction re-
ceived more judicial and scholarly attention, and two splits 
quickly developed in the Federal Circuit’s case law. 
First, Federal Circuit opinions diverged as to whether claim 
construction was purely a matter of law reviewed de novo or had 
factual components reviewed under a deferential clearly errone-
ous standard of review. The en banc Federal Circuit resolved 
this issue in Cybor Corp v FAS Technologies, Inc,8 holding that 
claim construction was purely a question of law reviewed de no-
vo.9 Cybor, however, has come under persistent attack from the 
patent community, with judges and scholars repeatedly arguing 
that claim construction has factual components that should be 
reviewed deferentially.10 
Second, a methodological split developed in Federal Circuit 
claim construction decisions. A claim-centric methodology ap-
plied a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of 
claim terms to a skilled person in the field at the time of inven-
tion, as derived from treatises, dictionaries, or other extrinsic 
sources. This methodology only consulted how claim terms were 
used in the patent specification’s description of the invention 
late in the claim construction process and for very limited pur-
poses.11 A specification-centric methodology emphasized that the 
 7 517 US 370, 391 (1996). 
 8 138 F3d 1448 (Fed Cir 1998) (en banc). 
 9 Id at 1456. 
 10 See, for example, Retractable Technologies, Inc v Becton, Dickinson and Compa-
ny, 659 F3d 1369, 1373 (Fed Cir 2011) (Moore dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc); Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 469 F3d 1039, 1040–46 (Fed Cir 2006) 
(denying en banc review, with seven judges concurring or dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc and arguing for various levels of deference to district court claim con-
struction). See also J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An His-
torical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw U L 
Rev *61–71 (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150360 (visited May 7, 2013); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of 
Claim Interpretation, 14 Harv J L & Tech 1, 9–10 (2000). 
 11 See, for example, Texas Digital Systems, Inc v Telegenix, Inc, 308 F3d 1193, 
1202–05 (Fed Cir 2002). See also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation 
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use of claim terms in the patent’s specification was “the single 
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” and relied on ex-
tensive and early use of the specification to define the disputed 
claim term.12 
The Federal Circuit granted en banc review in Phillips v 
AWH Corp13 to resolve this methodological dispute. In this 2005 
en banc decision, the Federal Circuit seemed to endorse the 
specification-centric methodology when reciting the appropriate 
legal standards for claim construction.14 However, when it ad-
dressed the actual claim term under review, it adopted a con-
struction based on the “generic meaning” of the term derived 
from a dictionary, rejecting a construction derived from the de-
scription of the term in the specification.15 As a result, both com-
peting lines of authority have cited Phillips as support for their 
position.16 Recent empirical work shows that the Federal Cir-
cuit’s methodological split remains as prevalent as before Phil-
lips.17 If anything, the methodological split has become stronger, 
as a third distinct methodology can now be identified in the case 
law: looking to the specification to identify the patentee’s “actual 
invention,” then tailoring the claim language as necessary to 
capture this “actual invention.”18 
Thus, in recent years, the Federal Circuit has faced two 
primary claim construction issues, both of which it had previous-
ly failed to resolve en banc. Each issue has been raised in nu-
merous petitions for en banc review. The Federal Circuit de-
clined opportunities to address the methodological split en 
 12 Vitronics Corp v Conceptronic, Inc, 90 F3d 1576, 1582 (Fed Cir 1996). See also 
Cotropia, 47 Wm & Mary L Rev at 87, 105 (cited in note 11). 
 13 415 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc). 
 14 Id at 1315–17, 1320–24. 
 15 Id at 1324–27. 
 16 Compare On Demand Machine Corp v Ingram Industries, Inc, 442 F3d 1331, 
1337–38 (Fed Cir 2006) (describing Phillips as emphasizing a specification-centric meth-
odology), with Retractable Technologies, 659 F3d at 1371–72 (Moore dissenting from de-
nial of rehearing en banc) (citing Phillips as having resolved the methodological split in 
favor of a claim-centric approach). 
 17 Wagner and Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? at *20–22, 30 (cited in 
note 5). 
 18 See, for example, Arlington Industries, Inc v Bridgeport Fittings, Inc, 632 F3d 
1246, 1258 (Fed Cir 2011) (Lourie concurring in part and dissenting in part). By starting 
with the description of the invention in the specification and then interpreting claim 
terms creatively to reflect this invention, this third approach differs from the traditional 
specification-centric methodology, which starts with a specific claim term and then looks 
to the usage of this term in the specification to define the term. See generally Greg Reil-
ly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction, 20 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 
(forthcoming 2014). 
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banc,19 choosing instead to address the standard of review en 
banc in Lighting Ballast. That choice was a mistake. 
II.  RESOLVING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BEFORE 
METHODOLOGY IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
Increased deference to the district court’s claim construction 
will not have a substantial impact on the primary problems that 
plague claim construction, at least as long as the methodological 
schism remains. The Federal Circuit’s claim construction juris-
prudence has been criticized for creating both ex ante unpre-
dictability as to patent scope before litigation and ex post uncer-
tainty in litigation even after the district court has issued its 
claim construction order. Theoretically, deferential review of 
claim construction will reduce ex post uncertainty by decreasing 
the chances that a district court claim construction will be re-
versed on appeal. But, by definition, it will have no impact on ex 
ante unpredictability, since the increased chances that the dis-
trict court’s claim construction will be the legally operative de-
termination of patent scope cannot improve public notice of pa-
tent scope until after that construction is issued in litigation. 
Because the choice between claim construction methodologies 
drives case outcomes, ex ante unpredictability will remain ram-
pant unless and until the Federal Circuit resolves its methodo-
logical schism.20 
A reduction in ex post uncertainty in litigation could have 
positive benefits by removing disincentives to settle and decreas-
ing litigation costs. But the costs of ex post uncertainty in litiga-
tion pale in comparison to the costs of the ex ante unpredictabil-
ity of patent claim scope before litigation. Few patents are 
litigated and fewer still are litigated through a district court 
claim construction. Moreover, ex ante unpredictability creates 
significant inefficiencies in primary behavior, as a party may 
engage in unintentional infringement that could have been 
cheaply avoided, refrain from productive activities not actually 
within the claim scope, pay unnecessary royalties, and under-
take costly litigation.21 Leading commentators have identified ex 
 19 See, for example, Retractable Technologies, 659 F3d at 1373 (Moore dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (urging the court to consider both methodological and 
standard-of-review issues en banc). 
 20 See Wagner and Petherbridge, 152 U Pa L Rev at 1170, 1176–77 (cited in note 6). 
 21 See William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent 
Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L 
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ante unpredictability of patent scope, caused at least in part by 
unpredictable interpretive methodologies, as a prime cause for 
the patent system’s failures.22 
Moreover, increased deference to the district court’s claim 
construction is unlikely to generate even the limited benefits of 
greater ex post certainty in litigation, at least as long as the 
methodological schism remains. Empirical studies have found 
that the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate of district court 
claim constructions is driven by the methodological split; that is, 
when the Federal Circuit panel disagrees with the district 
judge’s claim construction, it is normally because the district 
court applied a different methodology than that preferred by the 
panel. One study attributed 75 percent to 82 percent of Federal 
Circuit claim construction reversals to the methodological split.23 
When a district court chooses between the two competing 
methodological approaches to claim construction—for example, 
whether to emphasize the ordinary meaning found in extrinsic 
sources, or the description of the invention in the specification—
it is adopting a particular legal standard or test for resolving 
claim construction. Courts, including the Federal Circuit, review 
whether a district court applied the correct legal standard or 
test for resolving an issue de novo, even when the issue itself is 
subject to deferential review.24 Thus, changing the standard of 
J 327, 338 (2009); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability 
of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U Miami L Rev 1033, 1041–42 (2007). 
 22 See, for example, James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How 
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 10 (Princeton 2008). 
 23 See Wagner and Petherbridge, 152 U Pa L Rev at 1143–45 (cited in note 6). See 
also David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construc-
tion Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich L Rev 223, 265–66 (2008) (identifying 
methodological inconsistencies as a potential cause of high claim construction reversal 
rates); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev 231, 247 (2005) (suggesting methodological issues 
as the most likely cause for high claim construction reversal rates). But see Anderson 
and Menell, 108 Nw U L Rev at *57–59 (cited in note 10) (finding the recent decrease in 
Federal Circuit reversal rates despite persistence of methodological split). 
 24 See, for example, MarcTec, LLC v Johnson & Johnson, 664 F3d 907, 915–16 (Fed 
Cir 2012) (“Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard [for an excep-
tional case] under § 285 is a question this court reviews de novo, and we review the 
court’s exceptional case finding for clear error.”); Cancer Research Technology Ltd v Barr 
Laboratories, Inc, 625 F3d 724, 728–29 (Fed Cir 2010) (“We review a district court’s de-
termination of prosecution laches for abuse of discretion, but we review the legal stand-
ard applied by the district court de novo.”) (citations omitted); Glass v United States, 258 
F3d 1349, 1353 (Fed Cir 2001) (“The underlying question of whether the shareholders 
are third party beneficiaries to the alleged contract is a mixed question of law and fact, 
but the appropriate test for third party beneficiary status is a question of law that we 
review de novo.”). 
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review for claim construction will have limited impact on the 
bulk of reversals where the district court chose the wrong side of 
the methodological split from that preferred by the Federal Cir-
cuit panel. Its impact will be only on the remaining one-fifth to 
one-quarter of claim construction reversals, providing at most a 
marginal effect on ex post certainty in litigation. 
Because the appellate standard of review for claim construc-
tion will have no effect on the more important problem of ex 
ante unpredictability of claim scope before litigation and at best 
a marginal impact on the less important problem of ex post un-
certainty during litigation, the Federal Circuit’s en banc pro-
ceedings in Lighting Ballast are hardly worth the effort and 
money that the court, the parties, and the patent community 
will expend. Not only are the proceedings of limited value, they 
are affirmatively detrimental by consuming the Federal Circuit’s 
limited resources—physical, political, and psychological—for en 
banc proceedings, distracting from the far more important 
methodological split, and creating false expectations that the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction problems will be cured as 
soon as a more deferential standard of review is adopted. 
III.  THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW BEFORE METHODOLOGY 
The proper standard of review depends on the nature of the 
issue being reviewed. Findings of historical facts are subject to 
deferential clear error review in civil cases in recognition of the 
district court’s expertise and superior position in weighing evi-
dence and resolving credibility determinations.25 Legal questions 
are subject to unfettered de novo review because of the relative 
competence of appellate courts and the need for consistency and 
coherent development of the law.26 And the standard for mixed 
questions of fact and law depends on whether the trial court or 
appellate court is better positioned to decide the issue and 
whether the questions of law or questions of fact are likely to 
predominate the mixed question.27 Which of these categories 
best describes claim construction depends on the specific meth-
odological approach to claim construction. 
 25 George C. Pratt, 19 Moore’s Federal Practice § 206.03[3] at 206-16 (Matthew 
Bender 3d ed 2012). 
 26 Id at § 206.04[2] at 206-24 to -25. 
 27 Id at § 206.04[3][a]–[b] at 206-25 to -28.  
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In general, a claim construction methodology that empha-
sizes use of a claim term in the patent document itself and dis-
courages use of expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence 
about the general meaning to a skilled person in the field—the 
specification-centric approach being an example—looks more 
like the quintessentially legal task of interpreting a written doc-
ument, which appellate courts are as capable of as trial courts 
and therefore review de novo.28 To the extent that this approach 
leaves some room for extrinsic evidence about a skilled person’s 
knowledge and understanding, rendering claim construction a 
mixed question, de novo review likely would still be appropriate 
because legal questions regarding the written document itself 
would predominate. 
On the other hand, like the claim-centric approach, a claim 
construction methodology that emphasizes the ordinary or plain 
meaning that a claim term would have in the abstract to a 
skilled person in the field, rather than emphasizing the disclo-
sure of the patent itself, would require an inquiry more like the 
historical fact finding normally entitled to deferential review.29 
This approach may constitute a mixed question because it calls 
for a limited inquiry into the disclosure of the patent specifica-
tion to determine whether the plain meaning has been clearly 
rebutted. Nevertheless, the factual issues about a skilled per-
son’s abstract understanding likely would predominate over the 
limited role given to the written document and justify deferen-
tial review.  
Finally, depending on how the third competing claim con-
struction methodology—tailoring the claim language as neces-
sary to reflect the “actual invention” disclosed in the patent 
specification—is characterized, it could be seen as (1) an exercise 
in interpretation of a written document, subject to de novo re-
view, or (2) identification of the historical fact of what a skilled 
person in the field would understand the patentee to have in-
vented, subject to deferential review. Notably, the Federal Circuit 
reviews the similar question of whether the patent specification 
 28 See, for example, Valley National Bank v Abdnor, 918 F2d 128, 130 (10th Cir 
1990). 
 29 See, for example, National Union Fire Insurance Co of Pittsburgh, PA v Circle, 
Inc, 915 F2d 986, 989 (5th Cir 1990) (stating that contract interpretation is reviewed 
deferentially if it is based on extrinsic evidence about party intent). 
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sufficiently describes the invention for purposes of patent validi-
ty as a factual question reviewed deferentially on appeal.30 
Because different methodological approaches could dictate 
different standards of review, the standard of appellate review 
of claim construction cannot be fully or reliably determined 
without first resolving the methodological division. Doing so will 
lead to an uninformed decision that lacks a sound theoretical 
justification. And, worse, the more deferential review that will 
likely result from Lighting Ballast may be used as a trump card 
in the methodological debate. A holding that claim construction, 
in full or part, is entitled to the deferential review given to fact 
questions may then be used as evidence that the proper claim 
construction methodology should emphasize factual inquiries, 
like the abstract meaning to a skilled person in the field.31 But 
the substantive legal doctrine should decide the standard of re-
view, not the other way around. A decision on the far less im-
portant standard of review question could create a Trojan horse 
that dictates the result of the far more important methodological 
question, without direct consideration or resolution of that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Because en banc resolution of the standard of review is not 
only of questionable value in light of the Federal Circuit’s deep 
split over claim construction methodology, but also could be det-
rimental to resolution of the far more important methodological 
issue, the wisest course for the Federal Circuit is to dissolve the 
en banc proceedings in Lighting Ballast as improvidently grant-
ed. The Federal Circuit does not appear to have ever taken such 
a step, though its rules permit it,32 and the Supreme Court regu-
larly dismisses writs of certiorari as improvidently granted.33 
Unfortunately, the claim construction standard of review has 
been a popular cause among judges and commentators for years, 
 30 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Eli Lilly and Company, 598 F3d 1336, 1355 (Fed 
Cir 2010) (en banc). 
 31 See Anderson and Menell, 108 Nw U L Rev at *70–71 (cited in note 10) (arguing 
in favor of more deferential appellate review because it would lead to greater emphasis 
on expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence).  
 32 See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Internal Operating Proce-
dures #14(8), online at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov 
/images/stories/rules-of-practice/IOPsMaster.pdf (visited May 1, 2013). 
 33 See, for example, Laboratory Corp of America Holdings v Metabolite Laborato-
ries, Inc, 548 US 124, 125 (2006). 
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and the Federal Circuit is not likely to shy away from it now, 
having gone down this road already. 
Therefore, the best realistic outcome of the Lighting Ballast 
en banc proceedings is that the Federal Circuit recognizes the 
importance of resolution of the methodological split to the proper 
standard of review and the limited impact that even the broad-
est pronouncement on the standard of review will have on the 
problems that plague claim construction. If it does, the court 
likely will avoid a broad holding that claim construction is al-
ways factual or heavily fact intensive in favor of a narrower 
holding that district court findings about the factual state of the 
art or knowledge of a skilled person based on extrinsic evidence 
are entitled to deference. By doing so, the court will defer weigh-
ing in on the propriety or importance of this type of evidence in 
claim construction until it is ready to directly address the meth-
odological split en banc. 
 
   
